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1. Introduction 
Sociology has come late to the field of Human Animal Studies (HAS), and such 
scholarship remains peripheral to the discipline. Early sociological interventions in 
the field were often informed by a critical perspective, in particular feminism but 
also Marxism and critical race studies. There have also been less critical routes taken, 
often using approaches such as actor-network theory and symbolic interactionism. 
These varied initiatives have made important contributions to the project of 
animalizing sociology and problematizing its legacies of human-exclusivity. As HAS 
expands and matures however, different kinds of study and different normative 
orientations have come increasingly into relations of tension in this eclectic field. 
This is particularly so when it comes to the ideological and ethical debates on 
appropriate human relations with other species, and on questions of whether and 
how scholarship might intervene to alter such relations. However, despite 
questioning contemporary social forms of human-animal relations and suggesting a 
need for change, the link between analysis and political strategy is uncertain. 
This paper maps the field of sociological animal studies through some 
examples of critical and mainstream approaches and considers their relation to 
advocacy. While those working in critical sociological traditions may appear to have 
a more certain political agenda, this article suggests that an analysis of 'how things 
are' does not always lead to a coherent position on 'what is to be done' in terms of 
social movement agendas or policy intervention. In addition, concepts deployed in 
advocacy such as rights, liberation and welfare are problematic when applied 
beyond the human. Even conceptions less entrenched in the liberal humanist 
tradition such as embodiment, care and vulnerability are difficult to operationalize. 
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Despite complex and contested claims however, this paper suggests that there might 
also be possibilities for solidarity. 
 
2. Critical sociologies and animal studies 
 It is only relatively recently that influential voices have been heard to argue 
that sociology must fully embrace the world of non-human beings, objects and 
things and the ways our lives are constituted with them (Latour, 2010: 75-78). These 
critiques have helped to open up the discipline to new areas of concern, such as 
animal studies, with recent sociological work in animal studies further destabilising 
our certainties of the ‘social’ (Carter and Charles, 2011; Taylor and Signal, 2011). 
Sociological interest in non-human animals has also been brought into view through 
more established sub-areas such as science and technology studies (Twine, 2010), 
food and eating (Cole and Stewart, 2009) or the family (Aull-Davies and Charles, 
2008). It is important to remember however that interrogating naturalised categories 
has been a sociological preoccupation, and thus sociology lends itself to 
problematizing the human/non-human animal binary and the ways this is played 
out in social formations. In addition, species is constituted by and through ‘human’ 
hierarchies – ideas of animality and of ‘nature’ are vitally entangled in the 
constitution of ‘race’, gender, class and other ‘human’ differences with which critical 
sociologies have well established concern. As Burowoy (2005: 268) has argued, it is 
critical sociologies which often draw attention to the omissions of the disciplinary 
mainstream and identify new subjects and objects for study. Twine (2010: 8) has 
suggested that sociological animal studies might be understood in Burowoy’s terms 
as a ‘critical sociology’.  
While human-animal studies may be new, and raise questions for the 
disciplinary mainstream, simply including non-human animals as a sociological 
subject does not a critical sociology make however. In the tradition of C. Wright 
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Mills, critical sociology has tended to argue that sociology must be ‘for’ something, 
and be used to advocate for social change (Geary, 2009). Mills was deeply opposed 
to the mainstream of the discipline which claimed objectivity and disinterested 
observation while functioning to validate the status quo (see Mills 2000: 25-49). For 
Mills, the politically committed sociologist reveals the ‘way things are’. Through this 
process of critical investigation, such sociology reveals a world of possibility and 
suggests paths for intellectual engagement and intervention (Summers, 2008).  
Peggs (2014: 42) suggests that sociological animal studies is likely to be 
associated with advocacy, for “In the light of the oppression of billions upon billions 
of non-human animals, how can the study of ‘human’ ‘animal’ relations fail to be 
politically engaged?”. Despite this, some scholarship can, and has been, disengaged 
because the ‘bringing in’ of animals as new subjects of sociological study has been 
via both mainstream and critical routes. On the one hand, we have a sociology which 
includes non-human animals and human-animal relations as worthy of sociological 
attention. On the other, we have sociological animal studies which raises questions 
about the exploitation and oppression of non-human animals, and is more reflective 
of critical traditions in sociological enquiry. This is not to say that critical sociologies 
are not resistant to the study of non-human animals, shaped by the belief that 
studying non-human animals lessens or undermines the notion of oppression, 
however. This, Wilkie (2013: 3) has suggested, is because for various reasons (inter 
and transdisciplinarity, a more-than-human focus, politicisation) association with 
HAS scholarship is “academically contaminat[ing]” and can tarnish professional 
credibility. Researching in a field of multiple species is a deviant practice and 
scholarship may be received by the mainstream as trivial or treated with derision, 
perhaps seen as ‘risky’ (Shapiro and de Mello, 2010: 167-70; Kruse, 2002: 337). 
Despite such marginality and marginalization, we have seen a rapid 
expansion of this ‘deviant’ field of social scientific enterprise such that human-
animal studies has become “everything to everyone” (Best, 2009: 13). For some 
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scholarship, relationships with activism are imperative, for others, a normative 
commitment to emancipatory sociology (whether or not it is specifically allied with 
activism) is what is key (Aaltola, 2011; Peggs, 2012). The development of Critical 
Animal Studies (CAS) in the early 2000s led to a strengthening of arguments for 
interested or engaged theory that in Mills sense is ‘for’ something, in this case, for 
the ‘liberation’ of non-human and increasingly also, human animals (Nocella II, 
Sørenson, Socha and Matsuoka, 2014; Taylor and Twine, 2014). CAS differentiates 
itself from Mainstream Animal Studies (MAS) by its focus on a politics of animal 
liberation that is critical of the intersected and co-constituted qualities of oppression 
and promotes an “interspecies alliance politics” (Best, 2006). Scholarly work in CAS 
is not disinterested, but clearly addresses an emancipatory agenda whereas MAS 
scholarship tends to be reformist and non-emancipatory. For Twine (2010: 8) 
however, the boundaries between CAS and MAS are blurred and the work of 
individual scholars is not always easy to pin down in terms of this divide; and 
Wilkie (2013: 11) suggests we might have a more dynamic view of the field with 
scholarship located along a MAS-CAS continuum depending on particular 
arguments made and subjects focused upon in particular work. Wilkie adds a 
further category of ‘radical animal studies’ (RAS) beyond CAS on her continuum 
(Wilkie, 2013: 14). This reflects the suggestion made by Best (2006) that the increasing 
mainstreaming of CAS undermines the radicalism of its analysis and its politics, and 
that animal liberation scholarship might need to further differentiate itself in a sub-
field of ‘radical animal studies’. Wilkie’s continum model of the field is to be 
commended, but it is difficult to see quite where feminist scholarship in animal 
studies (FAS) fits. Some FAS scholarship emerges from the broader field of 
ecofeminism (Author, forthcoming) and reflects a concern with intersectionality that 
informed the development of CAS (Best et al., 2009). Yet while clearly politically 
motivated, FAS scholarship is eclectic, and not always congruent with the left-
liberation activism of much CAS scholarship.  
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Linear continuums do not adequately capture the complexities of tension and 
inter-relation in this rapidly emerging field, yet taxonomies of MAS, CAS and FAS 
do function as useful shorthand for outlining analytic positions.  The next section 
outlines some examples of uncritical animal studies and then proceeds to consider 
more critical engagements - Critical Animal Studies (CAS) and Feminist Animal 
Studies (FAS) which I see as only partially overlapping projects. Having set out a 
politicised and non-politicised approach, the paper muddies the waters in the later 
sections. While different approaches may attempt to tell us ‘how things are’, and 
critical perspectives are particularly concerned to open up grounds for intervention 
and demonstrate a commitment to both revealing and changing the suffering of 
many non-human animals, the answer to the question of ‘what is to be done’ is not a 
straightforward one.  
 
3. Uncritical animal studies 
At a symposium some years ago, a keynote talk by a speaker who had been writing 
about the cultural history of the elephant, subjected the audience to pictures of 
elephants which had been killed as hunting trophies. During the paper, a critical 
animal sociologist who was unfortunate enough to be sitting next to me and my 
irritated muttering, passed a note which said: “this is uncritical animal studies”. 
Indeed it was. The paper raised no questions about the mass killing of elephants and 
it had nothing to say of the gendered, classed and imperialist context of this form of 
human ‘entertainment’. It merely told us that some people in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century killed elephants for sport and that elephants often had to be 
shot very many times before they died.  This section of the paper considers some 
more plausible examples of uncritical animal studies that are distinctly sociological.  
 One important way of drawing species into sociology has been in terms of 
understanding the process of historical change through formations of human 
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relations with non-human animals. Historical accounts have used modernity as a 
framework for theorizing human relations with non-human animals, mapping 
changing attitudes towards animals accompanying the dramatic changes of 
transition in European modernity, from relations of dependency, contingency, and 
religious inspired anthropocentricity to those of distance, sentimentality and 
ambivalence in more secular times (Thomas, 1983: 166-67). 
Least controversial for the disciplinary mainstream is a sociology which 
considers human relations with non-human animals to be relevant in that they are 
revealing about human beings themselves. Tester’s (1992) sociology of animal rights 
for example, concentrates on imposition of social relationships through regulation of 
human relations with other animals. He draws on the work of Elias in suggesting 
that the development of anti-cruelty legislation was part of the ‘civilizing process’ to 
discipline the working class (Tester, 1992: 68-88). Tester argues that how we think 
about animals does not tell us about the ontological condition of animals, but about 
ourselves, thus animal rights “is a morality about what it is to be an individual 
human who lives a social life” (1992: 16). Animal rights has nothing to do with any 
concern for sufferings humans may inflict upon animals, but is about humans 
making themselves feel ‘good’ as moral agents arguing for those who cannot argue 
for themselves (1992: 78).  
A slightly less anthropocentric account is provided by Franklin (1999) who 
contends we have recently seen significant qualitative changes in species relations as 
the categorical boundary between human and other animal species has been 
challenged with ‘postmodernization’. Modernity defined humans as rational, 
capable of self-improvement and potential goodness, and established clear 
boundaries between humans and animals. From the seventeenth to the twentieth 
centuries, animals were treated primarily as a resource for human improvement, so 
that meat eating and the use of animals in research became standard practices. As 
we move towards postmodernity however, ‘misanthropy’ has become a feature of 
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social life as we collectively reflect on our destruction of the natural world.  Animals 
are also associated with a sense of ‘risk’; which can be seen in food scares, or 
concerns about the preservation of ‘wildlife’. Finally, individuals suffer ‘ontological 
insecurity’ due to a depletion of family ties, sense of community and neighbourhood 
with changes in domestic relations (increased divorce rates and re-marriage) and 
patterns of employment (‘flexible’ labour markets and less job security). 
Consequently, people look to relationships with pets to provide stability and a sense 
of permanence in their lives (1999: 36). Thus Franklin suggests that we are 
developing ‘increasingly empathetic and decentred relationships’ with other species 
evidenced across a range of sites of human-animal relations – from entertainment to 
food, ‘pet’ keeping to hunting (1999: 35). There are significant empirically 
unsubstantiated sociological assumptions here; for example, that certain social 
changes (such as those in the family) have led to certain practices (like more people 
keeping pets), and that the reason people do so is to provide security. Second, whilst 
human relations with animals have undoubtedly changed, there have been different 
and competing conceptions of how humans can relate to other animals and both 
continuity and change in material practices. A model of increasing sentimentality 
ignores the contradictions embedded in our relations with animals and the different 
kinds of relations humans have with specific species.  
There is certainly merit in such observations that animals are co-
constitutive of human social arrangements, and that these relations change over 
time. What makes these examples of uncritical animal studies however, is that 
they evade consideration of the power relations articulated through such 
relationships. It is this focus on power and an identification with non-human 
animals as victims of forms of systemic human domination through which they 
are oppressed and exploited, that has led to the articulation of more critical 
approaches to the study of human-animal relations. As the founders of the Journal 
for Critical Animal Studies (Best et al, 2009) claim, what distinguishes critical 
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approaches is that they actively critique mainstream approaches in human-animal 
studies and they take a standpoint ‘for’ non-human animals. 
 
4. Critical Animal Studies, Feminist Animal Studies and intersectionalised 
emancipation 
In thinking about the development of critical approaches in animal studies, we have 
to consider the philosophical influences on the contemporary animal advocacy 
movement. Singer’s Animal Liberation (1990), first published in 1975, argued for the 
irrationality of ‘speciesism’, a prejudice which licences exploitative and oppressive 
practices that harm sentient beings. On the basis of utilitarianism, Singer argued that 
we should account for the interests of non-human animals, restrict the harms we 
subject them to and maximise their welfare. Objecting to Singer on the grounds that 
non-human animals have an interest in not being used for human ends, Regan (1983) 
developed a rights-based approach to our relations with other species claiming that 
many higher animals should be free from human abuse, use and interference on the 
grounds that they are ‘subjects-of-a-life’ (with interests, desires, a sense of 
themselves over time) and thereby had rights. As Cochrane (2012: 7) has remarked, 
the debate over animal interests versus animal rights has been focused on and 
continues to be polarised by, this Singer/Regan debate. 
 Feminism was engaged with issues of human relations with non-human 
animals from the early second wave (see Adams, 1976). In early works, some 
claimed that women’s social practices of care mean they are more likely than men to 
oppose practices of harm against animals (Salamone, 1982); or that women may 
empathize with the sufferings of animals as they have some common experiences; 
for example, female domestic animals are most likely to be ‘oppressed’ via control of 
their sexuality and reproductive powers (Benny, 1983: 142). A key strand of writing 
focused on gender roles, an ‘ethic of care’ and concern for non-human species, and 
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an important theme in early writings is that female values are a product of a 
different socialisation process and a different placement in the public and private 
division of labour. In ecofeminist writings in the 1980s this involved some claims 
that female socialisation inculcates characteristics of nurturance, sympathy, empathy 
and “feeling the life of the other” (Plant 1989: 1). Feminist critics like Mellor consider 
the patriarchal division of the human Western world into feminized private and 
masculinised public spheres involves, “an imposed altruism” (1992: 251), which does 
not extend empathy beyond family members. Donovan (2006) suggests however, 
that such critics have misunderstood ecofeminist care theory. Discussing the case of 
non-human animals as subjects of feminist concern, she argues that it is not  
 
a matter of caring for animals as mothers (human and non-human) care for 
their infants as it is one of listening to animals, paying emotional attention, 
taking seriously  - caring about – what they are telling us. (2006: 305)  
 
This implies a relational notion of species. Recently, Gruen (2015) has argued for 
the further development of a relational notion of the self, incorporating 
responsiveness and responsibility for the well-being of all creatures, informed by 
‘entangled empathy’. For Donovan however, understanding the “qualitative 
heterogeneity of life forms” implies dialogical reasoning and the articulation of a 
non-human standpoint by feminist animal advocates (2006: 306-7).  
The feminist critique of animal rights debates were that they failed to 
attend to the overlapping of intra-human forms of oppressions and exploitation 
with those in which non-human animals were caught. Whereas utilitarianism and 
animal rights theory has often scorned empathy and compassion as an unstable 
basis for ethical claims (Garner, 2005), feminist animal studies (FAS) has been 
sceptical of the deployment of enlightenment rationalism in the development of a 
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universal ethics for the human treatment of non-human animals. Rather, it is via 
our attentive observation and our compassion, even for creatures who might 
appear alien to us, that we might enter into ‘dialogue’. Donovan makes clear that 
attention and empathy must be accompanied by political engagement - through 
an analysis rooted in intersectional understandings of power and through 
advocacy which resists the objectification of animals and asserts their likely ‘point 
of view’.  
While Gaard (2012) is right to observe that the intersectionalised observations 
of FAS scholarship were ignored by much work in human-animal studies for twenty 
five years, there is now increasing discussion of  ‘entanglements’ of oppression 
(Nibert 2002). The development of ‘critical animal studies’ (CAS) has sometimes 
drawn clearly on FAS and ecofeminist understandings of intersectionality and 
promoted the awareness of interlinked forms of domination, inequality and 
hierarchy, alongside a need for advocacy. Booth (2011: 329) has described Critical 
Theory as “for the potential community of mankind and for the purpose of 
emancipation”. In a recent paper, Author and I (Author and Author, 2015) argue for 
a critical posthumanism that is for all that lives, and for the purpose of eliminating 
multiple forms of oppression.  Whilst this chimes with advocacy of ‘total liberation’ 
in CAS (Best, 2010), a notion reflected in the work of some ecofeminist scholarship 
(see jones, 2014), it is not entirely clear what advocacy of eliminating oppression or 
securing various liberations might entail, a point to which we will return.  
CAS has been hostile to uncritical approaches in human and animal studies 
which might critically discuss the problematic boundaries of human and animal, but 
tend not to problematize the systemic relations of social power which profoundly 
shape the lives of non-human animals. A case in point here would be Haraway, 
whose work Weisberg (2009) has criticised for its ‘intricate word play’ that pays lip 
service to the problematics of the human/animal binary, eschews activism opposing 
animal exploitation and continues to justify exploitative practices.  There are 
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divergent perspectives in the nature and quality of scholarly engagements with 
activism, with some more keen to promote synergies than others (respectively, Best 
et al. 2009 and Nocella et al 2014; and McCance 2013). Despite this, the notion that 
scholarship be critically engaged with undermining institutions of animal 
oppression has brought a wide range of scholarship for multiple disciplines under 
the banner of a CAS, which challenges the “intricate interrelationship” of 
“hierarchical power systems” within which humanity and the natural world are 
exploited (Best 2007: 3). 
 Some feminist work has allied itself strongly with a politics of animal rights 
and a stance of ‘total liberation’ (jones, 2014). But within feminist animal studies 
there tends to be more tolerance of a diversity of theoretical perspectives and 
practical political engagements. As a recent special issue of Hypatia on ‘Animal 
Others’ illustrates, there are a variety of positions some more closely allied to radical 
perspectives (Gaard 2012) and others to postmodernism (Stanescu 2012). What binds 
them is the appreciation of the precarious nature of animal lives, embodied 
materialism and a commitment to intersectional analysis. Whereas CAS has until 
recently marginalised feminist accounts, and often prioritises the impact of 
capitalism in apparently intersectional analyses (Nibert 2002; Torres 2007), FAS has 
produced rich accounts of the gendering of species, albeit that some work has 
underplayed other elements, such as the importance of race and culture in 
structuring species based oppression (Deckha 2012).  
 Feminist animal studies scholarship may well be more tolerant of diversity 
not just because of the plethora of feminisms, but also because there has been a 
concerted attempt to disturb the human/animal binary through a critique of liberal 
humanism and the articulation of different kinds of positions on embodiment and 
materiality. This is a very different trajectory from that of animal rights/liberation 
which has tended to try and empty moral theory of its humancentric biases whilst 
still holding fast to anthropocentric humanisms moral and methodological 
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commitments to reason (Diamond 2008). Thus a further difference between feminist 
and non-feminist critiques of human-animal relations is that feminism has been far 
more attentive to the ways anthropocentric humanism, ironically, influences debate 
on what emancipation for other animals might mean.  
Abolitionists like Francione (2000) argue that liberation means that 
domesticate animals must cease to be – having been bred into a state of dependency 
and indignity and lacking any viable ecological niche. For Plumwood (2000) 
however, humans have always been part of co-constitutive relations with other 
species, domestication cannot be entirely read as some original state of ‘fall’; and for 
Davies (1995) feminist concern for domesticate animals involves learning from them 
and appreciating their lifeways, not dismissing them as “inauthentic”. The 
Francionist position articulates the problematic dualism of civilization and 
wilderness in Plumwood’s view, or a gendered denegration of the ‘tame’ or 
domesticated (and thereby feminized) for Davies. Here, I think that we see Francione 
articulating a liberal humanist understanding of what liberation for animals might 
mean, while feminist approaches question presumptions of authenticity and the 
autonomous self (human or animal) in the liberal humanist frame of liberation. 
Emancipation in this feminist critique is not about freedom from constraint but 
about re-situating humans as ecologically embedded and embodied subjects of 
interspecies communities. FAS scholarship tends to articulate therefore, an 
embodied, affective, relational ontology.  
There have been disputes however, from within FAS. Plumwood (2000, 
2004) claims the ‘ontological veganism’ of Adams (that is, a position advocating 
individual abstention from all use of animals) is universalist and ethnocentric. 
Such advocacy presumes that, unlike other species, humans can place themselves 
outside or above nature in avoiding the use of animals that is part of the human 
condition as ecologically embedded beings. As an alternative Plumwood proposes 
‘ecological animalism’, wherein a critique of the human exploitation of animals is 
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combined with respect for different cultural meanings of certain practices (such as 
the hunting and eating of animals). Much rests here on how Plumwood reads 
Adams (1994a) as positing veganism as a universal truth, rather than a culturally 
situated tactic. Whilst Adams does not always foreground her work as culturally 
delimited, it is clear that, taken as a whole, her critique is aimed at the 
commoditisation of animals-as-meat in Western developed cultures, and she 
sometimes does spell this out very clearly (1994b: 83). In addition, Plumwood has 
her own universalist ontology here in respect of the inevitability of meat 
consumption in all cultures (Eaton, 2002). Nevertheless, Plumwood’s ‘ecological 
animalism’ is an attempt to reflect intersectionalised politics and understandings 
of the world, despite the rather misplaced attack on Adams as a vehicle for 
delivering this. 
My own preoccupations in FAS have been with developing sociological 
frameworks for the understanding of human-animal relations, elaborated by 
empirical studies of domesticate animals used for food and companionship. Human 
relations with other species are constituted by and through social institutions and 
processes which I have conceptualised as sets of relations of power and domination, 
which are consequential of normative practice. These interrelate to form a social 
system of human domination that I refer to as ‘anthroparchy’ (Author, 2005, 2011a). 
In addition, species relations are intrinsically co-constituted with other kinds of 
complex forms of domination (such as patriarchy, capitalism and colonialism) and 
assume specific spatialized and historical formations.  
Human domination therefore, is differentiated, and there are varied degrees 
of domination of other species by humans. I use the concepts of oppression, 
exploitation and marginalisation in order to describe this. I use the term ‘oppression’ 
to describe a harsh degree of relations of dominatory power which has species-
specific application – some species can be oppressed (such as farmed animals) and 
others cannot (such as intestinal flora). ‘Exploitation’ refers to the use of something 
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as a resource, for example, the exploitation of farmed animals for labour, skin, fur, 
flesh and other products, or the use of animals in guarding and herding. 
‘Marginalization’, I apply to the rendering of something as relatively insignificant, 
and has a similar meaning to humancentrism. There is diversity in the form and 
degree of human domination. For example, intensive forms of production in animal 
agriculture can be seen as extreme or strongly oppressive institutional sites. It is 
unlikely that all animals ‘used’ by humans experience domination in the same way, 
although there are strong similarities in the ways in which processes of 
domestication affect both companion and farmed animals. The oppressive 
experiences of farmed animals may be very different from that of prized ‘working 
animals’. The lives of animals kept as ‘pets’ are often very different from those of 
farmed animals, but there is also evidence of cruelty, neglect and abandonment of 
animals by their human ‘companions’, and of industrial modes of exploitation in 
breeding (Author, 2011b). Both the range of differences and similarities in human 
relations with non-human animals need to be considered in developing a culturally 
sensitive, intersectional and species-differentiated approach to advocacy.  
Reflecting feminist critiques of the rationalist humanism framing approaches 
to animal rights and animal liberation, interventions focused on how we (humans) 
might live well with other (minded) animals seem more prescient than arguing for 
‘liberation’, ‘emancipation’ or animals as ‘rights’ bearing individual subjects. In 
developing a politics which contests oppression, it is important to remember that the 
concepts of liberation, emancipation and rights draw very heavily on the same 
European Enlightenment humanism which informed a model of political and 
cultural universalism that has had disastrous consequences for many peoples and 
non-human lifeworlds. While much has been written to effectively critique the 
liberal humanist underpinnings of colonialist and imperialist endeavours in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, liberal humanism persists still in the language 
of animal rights, just as it undergrids notions of human rights. But does a 
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problematizing of the liberal and Enlightenment foundations of emancipatory 
agendas mean that they cannot be disentangled from the imperialist missions and 
human-centred humanism? This needs to be carefully negotiated. Many of us 
working within CAS/FAS wish to advance an agenda which opposes the domination 
of life in all its variety. Yet as emancipatory politics has learned to its cost, 
conceptions of liberty, rights, wellbeing and so on are fraught with contradiction, 
and this is why an emphasis on the intersectional qualities of domination is so 
important. What unites various forms of critical scholarship is an understanding of 
‘humanity’ as embedded in networks of relations of dependency with the non-
human lifeworld, and seeing the fragility of embodied life, both human and non-
human. So then, with this in mind, what kinds of social changes might animal 
sociologists be concerned to promote? 
 
5. Sociology for other animals 
At the turn of the 21st Century, Shapiro (2002 p. 332) claimed that ‘animal 
studies’ had made ‘modest gains’ in improving the situation of non-human animals. 
There are those in uncritical animal studies who may agree that we have seen some 
positive changes, for example in the UK or the EU in terms of ‘improvements’ in 
farmed animal welfare and the mainstreaming of ideas about ‘happy’ and ‘humane’ 
farming and killing (Bock and Buller, 2013). However, in terms of the global spread 
of intensive models of animal agriculture, the situation for farmed animals was 
worse (regarding the numbers raised and killed) in 2002 than in 1972, and numbers 
of animals to be killed for food is predicted to double in the next fifty years, 
overwhelmingly through the spread of Western intensive methods (Food and 
Agriculture Organisation, 2002; Mitchell, 2011). The challenge faced by advocates 
contesting the killing of animals for ‘meat’ then, is considerable.  
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Marcus (2005) argues that there are four contestationary positions which 
interrogate our current social practices and institutions, and are embodied in current 
social movement activity: vegetarianism, animal rights, animal welfare and 
‘dismantlement’. Marcus appears to support an animal rights case for abolitionism – 
the avoidance of all animal use and exploitation, but in fact argues in favour of 
dismantlement, a term he uses to describe forms of progressive welfarism which 
works towards the ultimate undermining of the industries of animal agriculture and 
animal experimentation, disassembled one piece at a time (2005: 79). For Marcus, a 
gradualist approach might enable the transformation of public opinion through 
increasing sensitivity to animal welfare. While intensive animal agriculture spreads 
apace across the globe, welfarist arguments clearly seem to have little traction in 
arresting the scale of the violence inherent in the raising and killing of non-human 
animals for food and have secured but minor changes in industrial animal 
agriculture and only then, predominantly in more developed countries. It can also be 
argued that that minor welfare gains may function to legitimate the practices of such 
industries by improving their public image. There is however, little empirical 
evidence either that welfarism sensitises public opinion to animal abuse, or that it 
relieves tensions attending current practices, in order to substantiate such positions. 
Nevertheless, we might consider whether a welfarism of a more critical kind might 
be a tool through which critical sociological animal studies might engage policy fora 
on a path to a less oppressive future for non-human animals. 
This is certainly the kind of future a critical welfarist such as Marcus hopes 
for, but for others advocating a welfare agenda, such as Haraway, there is no utopia 
that can be realised (2008: 106). In Haraway’s relativist mode of ethical relating, non-
human animals cannot be liberated; rather, we must strive for incremental kinds of 
changes that emerge from the best, most caring and reflexive of human-animal 
interactions that take the animals’ point of view seriously. While such sentiments 
might be laudable, Haraway’s view of what this might actually entail does not 
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reflect most FAS understandings of what care, respect and flourishing for non-
human animals might mean in practice. She suggests, for example, that we might 
enrich the lives of laboratory animals and farmed animals as far as we are able, and 
kill them as kindly as we can. Her preferred notion of ethical eating and living with 
Other animals owes more to Michael Pollans’ ‘locavorism’, a minimally welfarist 
position unsubstantiated on environmental grounds (see CIWF, 2002), and often 
embedded in both social and political conservatism (Stănescu, 2010). It is only 
marginally disruptive to the humancentric discourse and practices of animal 
agriculture and animal foodways.   
Francione’s (1996) objection to welfarism, even that more radically 
intentioned such as the ‘new welfarism’ of Marcus, is that it reinforces the legal 
status of animals. As long as animals are property, he claims, human interests will 
always outweigh those of any animal, individually or collectively, and however 
slight the issue of conflict. Welfarism therefore, does not challenge the foundational 
logic of the social domination of species. In this, Francione is right, but he 
problematically assumes here that social reality is constituted by and through law. In 
addition, given the investment of states and state-like international organizations in 
animal agriculture, to place faith in the state as potentially transformational in 
tackling human species domination is misplaced optimism. Welfarism is certainly a 
rearticulating of species domination through pastoral rather than disciplinary power 
(Cole, 2011). However, whether concerns for welfare and legal change can never be 
disruptive to species relations is less certain. There may be some rapprochement 
between interventions if the language used to describe such practices was less 
polarised across a welfarist-liberation dualism, and if we considered more concretely 
what kinds of shifts in human relations with non-human animals might be 
supported from a critical sociological standpoint.  
In terms of what substantive change might look like, an important 
sociological basis for thinking about this is to consider what matters for what species 
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in which context of social relations. While Bests’ notion of ‘total liberation’ may be a 
political rallying cry for those of us interested in intersectionality and radically 
reconfiguring human-animal relations, it does not specify what is to be done. Recent 
publications in CAS (for example, Nocella et al, 2014) contain a range of interesting 
contributions which all skirt in different ways around the question of intervention 
and of academic advocacy. Some suggest a politics of ‘groundless solidarity’ in 
which, 
 
one does not attempt to take power or impose a hegemonic mindset on 
others, but…create[s] space for others to have autonomy. This means that 
we must….struggle to help non-humans create spaces where they can 
flourish and develop their own organic relations and communities 
(Colling, Parson and Arrigoni, 2014: 68).  
 
What does such radical talk mean, however, in terms of what interventions might 
be supported? Colling et al go on to say that fighting against institutions that 
imprison, abuse and kill  non-human animals (like those of farming and 
experimentation), supporting those animals who “resist their human oppressors” 
(such, perhaps, as those escaping from farms or slaughterhouses), and stopping 
the geographic marginalisation of wild animals.  But this is not ‘liberation’ in the 
conventional sense as deployed in Western political theory. Supporting farmed 
animals through the sanctuary movement is a demonstration of care and respect 
for animal-being, rather than an act of liberation in which non-human animals are 
set free.  
Jenkins and Stӑnescu (2014: 76-83) articulate an ‘engaged veganism’ as an 
agenda for change. But while this clearly demonstrates political commitments to 
intersectional emancipation, it certainly does not appreciate the complexity of 
intersectionality in social movement praxis or in human lifeways. They reject any 
form of welfarism as apologia for human abuse of domesticate animals and 
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consider anything less than a total liberation perspective as somehow cancelling 
any political standpoint – feminists who participate in animal abuses are 
therefore, ‘not’ feminists. Despite their caveats, it seems that Jenkins and Stӑnescu 
can determine the parameters of an intersectional politics and that what liberation 
for animals might mean is straightforwardly apparent. In the same volume Drew 
and Taylor (2014: 170-171) indicate however, that this is rather more difficult by 
asking how CAS scholarship might ‘know’ what animals might desire in terms of 
our research methods and our advocacy. That, for example, mammals seek to 
avoid pain, and that they are bored when severely confined seems 
incontrovertible as an agenda for change. This might be supported, I would hope, 
by sociological analysis of disciplinary institutions in perhaps an interdisciplinary 
frame where people who know more about reading the behaviour of non-humans 
than most sociologists might contribute. For other kinds of animals, particularly 
those less known and more alien to us, the task is more challenging. 
In addition to questions of epistemology, our language for change which is 
part of the difficulty. Cochrane (2012) offers a convincing case for animals having 
‘rights’ without being ‘liberated’, and his ethical arguments preclude much of the 
current treatment of non-human animals which CAS scholarship advocates 
against. While I am not quite convinced we need a notion of ‘rights’, FAS scholars 
in particular might be sympathetic, sceptical as many are of projects for 
‘liberation’ cast in mould of Enlightenment humanism (see Braidotti, 2013). Much 
posthuman thinking suggests that there is no autonomy – the liberal subject, be it 
human or non-human, is a myth and we are embedded in this world of diverse 
being, together. Perhaps then, a move away from conceptions of ‘liberation’ or of 
‘rights’ or of ‘welfare’ might provoke a less divisive and more nuanced discussion 
of what desirable transformations in human relations with other animals might 
look like. 
In researching various kinds of social practices, critical sociologists can 
illuminate the kinds of social institutions and practices in which certain species of 
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animals are embedded with humans and tease out the nature of oppressive 
practices. Herein, they might be able to suggest interventions in the normalisation 
of the practices of animal abuse which are so embedded in the cultures of more 
developed countries that they are rarely questioned. These might include, for 
example, raising questions about the normativity of socialising children into 
anthroparchal understandings of  human relations with non-human animals, such 
as the normativity of everyday ‘meat eating’ (Cole and Stewart, 2014); or raising 
questions about ‘animal agriculture’ for predominant discourses around 
sustainability (Twine, 2010).  
An adequate sociological understanding of systemic domination cannot 
elide different forms of domination and degrees of exploitation and oppression. 
We need to consider nuanced differences in human relations with different kinds 
of animals in different social contexts. Like others working in critical/feminist 
animal studies, I consider that human relations with non-human animals should 
be understood as assuming multiple and interlinked forms that can be 
understood as systemic. However, while there are links between more and less 
benign/abusive relations, differences need to be conceptualized. I do think, 
though many in CAS might disagree for example, that companion species 
relations, for example, between some humans and dogs are a glimpse of what can 
and might be, and a small opening into a world of potentially fruitful species 
cohabitations. Positive engagement with difference exists despite a social reality of 
dogs as ‘pets’, commodified and objectified as property; and notwithstanding the 
clear links between the keeping of non-human animals as companions in the 
home, and profit for animal agribusiness through the consumption of ‘pet food’.  
Where sociology has responded to HAS, it has often done so in specific 
arenas of interaction such as home, food and eating or rurality. There needs to be 
an expansion of the inclusion of research on human-animal relations into areas 
such as ‘work’ and the labour process, globalization and the scope of social theory 
must be more-than-human. Critical scholarship can suggest processes and 
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practices in which specific species are caught and through illuminating social 
forms might suggest a diversity of ways in which less benign human practices 
might be addressed. In doing so, we might build up from progressive reform as a 
starting point in terms of engagement with the polity through policy intervention. 
There will be possibilities for more transformative and critical work with social 
movement organizations and public engagement (such as vegan outreach). In 
addition, the continual expansion of animal studies is (slowly) shifting academic 
agendas, for example, through the mainstreaming of critical approaches to animal 
studies stressing the importance of intersectional analysis.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We live in a complex world of multiple social relations and an important 
contribution of sociology has been the increasingly sophisticated mapping of the 
way these interact. These are of utmost relevance to understanding the social 
forms which our relationships with non-human animals take. This paper has 
urged sociologists in general to consider ‘the animal’, and animal sociologists to 
think more critically and also to be open to a range of forms of advocacy. We live 
in the age of the Anthropocene and there is no escaping the human. We also are 
embedded in this life together with multifarious other species. A critical and 
sociological analysis of human relations with non-human animals can provide us 
with the tools for the theorisation of species in terms of human domination, 
exploitation and oppression, while remaining sensitive to differences in the kind 
and degree of human practices. Being critically sociological, it should be 
underpinned by the conception that the oppressions of human and non-human 
animals are intersected. Finally, a critical sociology of species must be an engaged 
sociology, a call to action which grounds its attempts to theorise, document and 
explain the world in the context of political struggles to change it. The intersection 
of inequality and difference means that human populations, communities and 
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individuals are differently placed in responding to choices of how they interact 
with the multiplicity of non-human species of ‘animal’. Sociological animal 
studies of kinds still need to reflect this more deeply, but critical animal studies 
scholarship in particular might emphasize securing change through 
transformation in human social relations with other animals, rather than a politics 
of species separatism.  
 I have argued here for an advocacy agenda that is open to various forms of 
engagement. I do think that in terms of policy innovation, the state and international 
organisations are conservative and difficult to challenge and that an agenda of non-
human animal ‘welfare’ is probably a necessary starting point. It is also a starting 
point that might lead elsewhere as there is more possibility for engaging with 
transformatory agendas in civil society and in working alongside and within social 
movement organisations. Any agenda for change must be situated in localities with 
varied cultures and conditions and here, careful studies of specific sites of human-
animal relations and particular formations of the human use of other animals, will be 
of great value. 
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